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ABSTRACT 
The Influence of Politics and Institutional Position  
  on Distributive Policies.  (May 2005) 
Emily Morgan Bonneau, B.S., Eastern Michigan University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Jon R. Bond 
 
 
Central to the distributive theory is the idea that members of Congress can use 
strategic committee assignments to fund pork projects for their districts.  Committees 
that are primarily constituency service based are considered most susceptible to pork 
barrel politics.  The Public Works and Transportation Committee, in particular, has 
developed a reputation for distributing pork projects.  Adler’s (2002) study of six 
committees found impressive evidence that members of certain committees are able to 
channel disproportionate benefits to their districts—the lone exception was the Public 
Works and Transportation Committee.  Given the folklore about Public Works and 
“pork,” this result seems odd.  In this study, I make two major adjustments to the 
research design.  First, I isolate the dollars spent on committee programs that were not 
allocated by a formula.  Formulas have prior built-in controls that are not subject to 
bargaining after the formula has been set, and thus are not illustrative of the pork 
process.  Second, I expand the years studied (1983-1996) and analyze the data with a 
pooled cross-section/time series design, which better controls the potential effects of 
time on the distribution of federal funds.  These modifications do not produce results to 
reconcile the conflict with congressional folklore, instead they question the 
generalizability of allocation decisions for constituency service committees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
How much particularized benefits count for at the polls is extraordinarily 
difficult to say, but it would be hard to find a Congressman who thinks he 
can afford to wait around until precise information is available.  The lore 
is that they count. –Mayhew (1974, 57) 
  
 According to Mayhew, most members of Congress believe bringing benefits 
back home positively affects their chances for reelection, as it serves as something they 
can claim credit for in their next campaign.  Just as members of Congress have tried to 
obtain pork projects for their districts to satisfy their desire for reelection, political 
scientists have tried to investigate the political and institutional factors that are 
conducive to acquiring those benefits—with little consensus.  The distributive theory 
suggests the constituencies of committee members receive a disproportionate amount of 
benefits from the programs under their jurisdiction (Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). 
Thus, much attention has been placed on strategic committee assignments as the primary 
means of influence over distribution of pork projects, although the empirical evidence 
demonstrating committee bias has been mixed (e.g. Adler 2002; Rundquist and Carsey 
2002; Ray 1981; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975).  Recent research on the subject has 
shifted focus to other institutional power structures affecting acquisitions of pork 
projects, such as partisanship and seniority, as well as to political indicators of electoral  
vulnerability (e.g. Alvarez and Saving 1997b; Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, and Sigelman 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style and format of American Political Science Review. 
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2002; Bickers and Stein 1996; Rundquist and Carsey 2002).  The empirical evidence 
 produced by these studies also provides mixed support for the distributive theory. 
In this thesis, I seek to contribute to this debate and build on this research by 
extending Adler’s (2002) commendable study.  I am interested in examining whether the 
political motivations and institutional position of members have an effect on the 
distribution of particularized benefits over and above what would be expected by 
objective indicators of need for committees that are most focused on constituent service.  
According to the distributive theory, committees that deal primarily with constituent 
service, as opposed those committees that focus more on policy oriented issues, are most 
susceptible to pork politics.  Members join these “high demand” constituency service 
committees with the hope of siphoning off money for their own districts, to aid their 
reelection goals (Adler 2002).   
I propose to examine further the effects of committee membership on the 
distribution of federal funds, by extending Alder’s study in three important ways.  
Specifically, the distribution of pork projects varies over both space (i.e., across districts) 
and over time. Yet, the measures and research designs typically employed in previous 
studies of individual members’ behavior (including Adler’s) do not tap and analyze both 
types of systematic variation jointly.  I plan to extend the period of time studied to 14 
years and use a pooled cross-sectional times series to account for potential time effects 
on the distribution of federal projects.  Second, I control for the amount of each 
program’s allocation that is based on a formula.  Theoretically, formulas are created to 
distribute federal funds on the basis of need. The inclusion of formula dollars in the 
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analysis, as previously done by Adler, potentially skews the data towards finding 
significant control measures, which bias the results against the institutional and political 
indicators of pork politics.  Third, I add to the number of programs Adler identified 
under the jurisdiction of each standing committee included in my study to yield a more 
comprehensive list of committee programs. 
 In the next section, I review previous research on distributive politics, and 
explain the theory. The following sections in this thesis describe how my study seeks to 
correct some of the limitations of past research, and presents my analysis of distributive 
policies on both the Public Works and Transportation Committee and Agriculture 
Committee over the period 1983-96.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
Theory  
The distributive theory (Lowi 1964; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975) is based on 
the common assumption that members of Congress are motivated by the desire to be 
reelected (Mayhew 1974).  Congressional scholars typically assume that legislators seek 
to maximize the likelihood of their reelection and that members believe that actions 
taken while in office will affect their reelection odds.  This theory suggests that there are 
institutional structures in place that put certain members at an advantage in receiving 
particularized benefits for their districts.1  In order to further their goals of reelection, 
members will act strategically within their institutional position in Congress to bring 
home pork projects. 
Members of Congress are most able to benefit their district through membership 
on a specific standing committee that has jurisdiction over the interests most akin to their 
districts (Ray 1981; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975).  As rational actors seeking 
reelection, members want to collect pork money for their district, so they join the 
committee they believe best represents their district’s interests.   Certain committees are 
more inclined to serve constituency interests than others do; therefore, “constituency 
centered” committees are more likely to attract members interested in siphoning off 
money for the geographic allocation of benefits (Adler 2002; Adler and Lapinski 1997; 
Fenno 1973).  Consequently, the distributive theory asserts committees overrepresent 
districts with a particular interest in programs under that committee’s jurisdiction (Ray 
                                                 
1Lowi (1964, 690) defined policies that qualify as distributive benefits as those that can be subdivided into 
many parts and each of which can be implemented in different areas of the country.   
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1980).   If committees are overrepresentative of members holding particular interests 
specific to a committee’s area of influence, then those committees will be “outliers” on 
those particular interests relative to the chamber mean. In this thesis, I am interested in 
studying the constituency characteristics that determine a district’s level of “policy need” 
based on economic, social, and geographic information (Adler and Lapinski 1997, 898).  
This approach focusing on policy need differs from studies that found no evidence that 
committees are “preference outliers,” or overrepresented with particular constituency 
interests using measures of political ideologies (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Groseclose 
1994; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Krehbiel 1990, 1991).  Comparing members’ 
ideologies on a specific committee to the ideologies of the chamber as a whole does not 
have much relevance to any claims of overrepresentation according to the distributive 
theory.  Instead, investigating whether or not a committee is a “preference outlier” is 
most relevant for studies involving aspects of policy-making. For this thesis, I focus on 
identifying whether the districts that have the highest degree of policy need and those 
that hold the most interest in the programs under a committee’s jurisdiction, actually 
make up the membership of the selected committees.  Focusing on the need and interest 
indicators is more integral to determining how policy benefits are allocated than 
comparing the ideology of the committee to that of the chamber.2 
Because electoral considerations induce members to join a specific committee, 
one would expect that there is a payoff from serving on that particular committee.  If 
                                                 
2A district’s level of “interestedness” is based on the amount of appropriations the district has received 
from the committee in the past.  If a district has received an amount, it has a vested interest to maintain the 
allocation in the coming years. 
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particular committees’ membership is concentrated with members of relatively 
homogenous interests, it follows that these legislators opt to sit on these committees in 
order to control the distribution of benefits for these specific policy areas with an eye 
towards securing benefits for their own districts.  These particularized benefits serve as 
political commodities, which members can use in their credit claiming strategy for 
reelection (Mayhew 1974).  
The committee structure itself facilitates the strategic distribution of pork 
projects (Weingast and Marshall 1988). Vote trading both between members within a 
committee and between members on different committees enables the successful passing 
of particularized benefits. Inter-committee logrolling between committees and non-
committee members when the issues under committee jurisdiction are not universally 
salient is “easiest to arrange” (Maltzman 1995, 677). Committees that deal with narrow, 
homogenous issues tend to be considered to be constituency based.  Non-committee 
members are more likely to allow these committee members more discretion in their 
allocation decisions because the programs under their power are of little interest, or 
salience to them (Maltzman 1995).  This committee-centered approach explains why 
pork programs are able to pass in legislation, even when they benefit a minority.  Non-
committee members will want to support a committee’s proposed pork barrel programs, 
even if they do not benefit from them, in exchange for support for the programs that do 
benefit their district (Weingast 1994).   
This logrolling strategy differs from the more universalistic, coalition-forming 
approach.   Mayhew’s (1974) characterization of universalism is that legislators’ 
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common goal of reelection will act as an incentive to form large coalitions to bring 
geographically concentrated benefits to their own districts with costs evenly dispersed 
throughout the legislature.  However, generally universalism has not been supported by 
empirical evidence (Collie 1988; Stein and Bickers 1995). Instead, we expect members 
to join committees with jurisdictions over their “policy need” areas (Adler 2002; Adler 
and Lapinski 1997) and that their pork projects will be successful due to the logrolling 
across areas of special interests (Weingast and Marshall 1988). 
Logrolling is not exclusively an inter-committee activity, as members can, and 
often do, trade votes within their own committees to provide for their own “district-
directed” benefits (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Adler 2002, 83). To illustrate intra-
committee logrolling, one can consider the different indicators of policy needs a 
legislator may consider when joining the Public Works and Transportation Committee. 
Some members may be more interested in bringing home money for flood management 
programs, while others may want to secure money related to transportation programs.  
Members can cooperate and make deals within their committee to provide pork projects 
for each other’s constituencies, while still achieving their own particularized benefits. 
Members are likely to trade votes to help ensure that when the time comes, their 
particular projects will get through.  All members are driven by the desire to get their 
district-specific benefits passed through Congress, so they can use those acquisitions to 
aid their reelection efforts.  Bringing back programs that help their district’s economy is 
a good example of how individual members can demonstrate their effectiveness in 
Congress to their constituents and increase the likelihood of reelection (Mayhew 1974).  
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All members of Congress seeking reelection have motivations to use this credit-claiming 
strategy.  The research shows that House incumbents receive electoral benefits through 
the number of new program awards to their district (Stein and Bickers 1994) as well as 
increased federal outlays (Alvarez and Saving 1997b; Levitt and Snyder 1997).  
Mayhew’s (1974) statement that members believe particularized benefits count has been 
substantiated by empirical results—it is no longer lore. To that end, members who are 
electorally more vulnerable might try to use the acquisition of pork projects as a 
reelection strategy, so he or she will be able to take credit for it back home. 
While an electorally vulnerable member may have additional motivation to 
acquire pork projects, they must have the requisite institutional position to get them.  As 
mentioned before, belonging to the standing committee puts members right at the core of 
the allocation process for programs under the committee’s jurisdiction, as well as putting 
them in a position to logroll within the committee in order to acquire the program they 
want for their districts (Adler 2002; Weingast and Marshall 1988).   
Members need to work within the committee’s structure of power to make the 
compromises necessary to bring home-particularized benefits.  The effect of one’s party 
can combine with the effect of committee membership to shift the distribution of 
benefits to one’s favor (Cox and McCubbins 1993). The majority party has the power 
(based on membership size) to give a member an edge in acquiring project money for 
their district (Alvarez and Saving 1997b).  Partisan influence may be particularly 
important in distributive politics, in terms of protecting their party’s numbers, come 
election time.  If members think that bringing home benefits to their district helps their 
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reelection prospects, then the majority party should not allow the minority party equal 
access in acquiring those benefits. Logically, they would instead direct a greater 
proportion of federal funds to protect their party’s prospects; however, the majority party 
does not allocate exclusively to their members.  By including the minority party in pork 
projects, majority party members protect themselves from being solely blamed for 
wasteful spending (Alvarez and Saving 1997b; Balla et al. 2002).  Recent scholarship 
has demonstrated a majority party bias in the distribution of pork projects (e.g. Adler 
2002; Alvarez and Saving 1997b; Balla et al. 2002; Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Levitt 
and Snyder 1995; Rundquist and Carsey 2002).  Further, as a strategic move to help 
ensure that the majority party keeps its numbers to stay in the majority, members of the 
majority party who are electorally vulnerable receive a greater proportion of the benefits 
(Lee 2003).   
Due to their legislative experience, members who have the highest seniority may 
also be put at an advantage in acquiring benefits for their district.  Members who have 
been around longer have more skills in the actual legislative process (e.g. writing bills, 
chamber procedures, etc.), which helps them be more effective in politics across the 
board (Hibbing 1991, 1993).  
The institutional structures of committee membership, partisanship, and seniority 
can give a member of Congress an advantage in the allocation of distributive benefits.  
Electoral indicators of vulnerability can also influence the proportion of benefits a 
member receives.  I turn now to a discussion of past research. 
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The Findings and Limitations of Previous Research 
Research on the distribution of federal projects has reported a wide range of 
findings.  Some studies report committee members are able to procure more benefits for 
their constituencies than nonmembers (Alvarez and Saving 1997a; Carsey and Rundquist 
1999; Ray 1981; Rundquist and Carsey 2002); while others do not find any evidence of 
such a relationship (Levitt and Poterba 1999; Ray 1980; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975).  
Others have found mixed results for different committees (Adler 2002; Arnold 1979).   
The wide range of findings in the literature results in part from differences in 
measures and methods of analysis.   First, scholars have not come to a consensus on the 
appropriate unit of analysis for studies of distributive politics.  Several scholars have 
used states as the unit of analysis (Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Levitt and Poterba 1999; 
Rundquist and Carsey 2002; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975; Rundquist, Lee and Rhee 
1996) while others have used districts (Adler 2002; Alvarez and Saving 1997; Levitt and 
Snyder 1995; Ray 1981; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). Rundquist and Carsey (2002) 
observe that more data is available at the state level as well as that state data is more 
consistent because state boundaries do not change every ten years as districts’ 
boundaries do.  Further, representatives may have ambitions for higher political office 
that may serve as motivation to bring benefits back for their whole state, not just their 
own constituency (Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). The problem with using states as the 
unit of analysis in these studies is that it can result in biased estimates of congressional 
influence (Arnold 1979, 84-85).  Arnold found populations of states have a high level of 
variation from each other.  One would expect large population states to receive more 
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shares of benefits than those with small populations; thus, the dependent variable 
correlates with state population.  He also found committee membership is highly 
correlated with state population—those large states are more likely to have a member on 
a committee. 
The argument for districts as the unit of analysis in tests of the distributive theory 
is that the House is organized by districts, not states.  By analyzing data at the district 
level scholars are able to identify a district’s level of “policy need” (Adler and Lapinski 
1997), which is generally more homogenous than at the state level (Fenno 1982).  The 
specific make-up of a district can determine which committee the member serves on 
(Adler and Lapinski 1997; Carsey and Rundquist 1998), and defines what types of 
programs he can use to claim credit to his constituents to aid with his reelection.  Also, 
while members may have ambitions for higher office, the primary concern for members 
is reelection in their own districts (Mayhew 1974).  In this respect, members will profit 
more from the direct electoral payoffs of providing particularized benefits to their own 
districts than to the far-off payoff goals of supplying benefits to the entire state (Adler 
2002, 85).   In this thesis, I adopt Adler’s (2002) gains-from-exchange theory, which 
bases committee membership on constituency demands, and asserts committee members 
work within their committee to bring back particularized programs to their district.  The 
allocation of benefits is the sole focus of this study, so the choice of districts as the unit 
of analysis is appropriate and is the best way to capture the relationship between 
members of Congress and particularized benefits.   
 Along with varying units of analysis, previous studies of distributive politics 
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have analyzed different dependent variables over different time periods.  Although there 
are a number of appropriate measures of the key concepts in this literature, data 
limitations have frequently prevented an optimal test of the relations between committee 
members and the geographic allocation of federal funds. 
Some earlier studies specified their dependent variable as either change in 
expenditures by districts or by new outlays, as opposed to focusing exclusively on total 
outlays (Ferejohn 1974; Ray 1981; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975).  Their choice of using 
a measure of change in the outlay amount (or new outlays) better captures the 
relationship between current member of Congress and the benefits currently being 
brought home.  Using total outlays rather than a measure of change or new outlays could 
include the effects of previous members of the House serving that district (Alvarez and 
Saving 1997b).  The studies that used districts as a unit of analysis in this set of work 
were also limited by the data available at that period of time (Ray 1981; Rundquist and 
Ferejohn 1975).  District-level data was only available for large federal programs and 
this could have translated into a selection bias problem (Adler 2002).3 
An aggregation of all outlays to the district has also been used as the dependent 
variable (Levitt and Snyder 1995).  However, Adler (2002, 85) points out that at this 
broad level, the effects of the intra-committee logrolling under the gains-from-exchange 
model are not accounted for.  Aggregating outlays for programs under the jurisdiction of 
a specific authorizing committee corrects this problem.  
                                                 
3Programs that have a higher level of saliency attract more of an interest from other members.  Large 
federal programs, due to the size and expense, might attract more interested members than small, low 
saliency programs.  It is these small, low saliency programs that are suited best for distributive politics.  
Thus, with large programs scholars may not be able to observe the effects of pork barreling (Maltzman 
1995).   
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The different types of programs selected in previous studies can also explain in 
part the variation among the findings.  Several studies have focused on defense 
committee programs (Arnold 1979; Carsey and Rundquist 1998, 1999; Ray 1981; 
Rundquist and Carsey 2002; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975).  Studies have also looked at 
programs under the jurisdiction of the Public Works and Transportation Committee 
(Adler 2002; Arnold 1979; Ferejohn 1974; Lee 2003; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975), as 
well as various other programs and committees (Adler 2002; Balla et al. 2002; Stein and 
Bickers 1994).  The different scope and nature of programs may enable them to be more 
or less susceptible to the effects of distributive politics.  
Using district-level data regarding the outlays of programs under the Agriculture 
committee successfully captures the effect of committee membership on the allocation of 
distributive benefits consistent with the gains-from-exchange model.  Aggregating all 
programs under a committee’s jurisdiction accounts for the intra-committee-logrolling 
behavior.  If the study was limited to one specific program, the effects of intra-
committee logrolling would be lost.  Specifically, the examination of only one program 
could result in biased findings if the program was either very susceptible to pork politics, 
or less prone to such politics. By selecting a single or small group of programs to 
analyze, one risks not getting an accurate picture of the distributive politics on that 
particular committee.  In order to develop a valid test of this theory one must use the 
most valid measure available, which for this study is a dependent variable that is 
indicative of the nature of all the programs under the committee’s jurisdiction. 
This thesis revisits Adler’s (2002) study, in which he analyzed six different 
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standing committees-- Agriculture, Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs; Interior and 
Insular Affairs; Public Works and Transportation; Science, Space, and Technology; and 
Veterans’ Affairs--that are disposed to pork barrel activity.  He analyzed four 
Congresses, the 99th, 100th, 101st, and 104th, using an Ordinary Least Squares 
regression.  This analysis found evidence of disproportionate benefits going to 
committee members’ districts for every committee except Public Works and 
Transportation—a committee with a notorious reputation for pork barrel politics.  It is 
puzzling that a committee “...often considered one of the main providers of federal 
project grants to localities” (Adler 2002, 87) was the only panel in Adler’s study that did 
not have evidence of pork politics.   
In this study, I seek to contribute to this debate and build on this research by 
extending Adler’s (2002) study for two committees, Public Works and Transportation 
and Agriculture.   By making the following adjustments and methodological alterations, 
I am interested to see if Adler’s puzzling finding regarding the Public Works and 
Transportation Committee lack of committee bias in distributive politics still holds.  
Also, in an effort to make this study more comprehensive, I make the same adjustments 
to the analysis of the Agriculture Committee, to see if my extensions produce results that 
are unique to the Public Works Committee, or whether these methodological alterations 
may influence findings regarding other high-demand committees.   
Using a method that does not account for the variance over time could partly 
explain Adler’s findings.  Adler separately analyzed four different Congresses, which 
did not allow him to account for the effects of time on the distribution of federal 
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projects.  Using a pooled cross-sectional times series accounts for potential time effects 
on the federal allocations (Rundquist and Carsey 2002).  I believe that utilizing a panel 
design that enables me to analyze both cross-sectional and time components of the 
relationship between committee membership and the allocation of pork projects, is an 
important consideration that most of the distributive work has neglected.4 
 
                                                 
4
 Rundquist and Carsey (2002) used pooled cross-section/time series analysis, but with the state as the unit 
of analysis. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
 The units of analysis are congressional districts over the period 1983 to 1996.  
The number of observations is over 6000 (435 House members x 14 years = 6090), 
though the actual n analyzed is smaller due to retirements and vacancies.   
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the aggregated outlays of all nonformula programs 
under the jurisdiction of the Public Works and Transportation and Agriculture 
Committee, in the form of total dollar amounts allocated to each congressional district in 
each calendar year over the period 1983 to 1996.5   
This measure differs from previous studies that have used as their dependent 
variable as aggregated program total outlay dollars, not controlling for the nature of 
allocation for each individual program.  How a program is allocated is important to 
understanding the nature of distributive politics.  At the time of creation, Congress 
decides to what extent—if at all—the program’s outlays are going to be allocated based 
according to a formula of need-based indicators.  The purpose of determining a 
program’s funds by a mathematical formula is to ensure that the money is going to 
districts that meet the specific criteria.  This does not remove politics from the process 
however; formula writing just moves the deal-making politics to the point in the process 
in which the formula is determined.  If a member of Congress can work their interest 
into the formula, then the allocation is subsequently automatic, and they do not have to 
continuously work at getting specific benefits for their district.  Getting one’s interest 
                                                 
5Dependent variable is total outlay dollars (divided by 1000s). Dollars are adjusted to constant 1982 
dollars. 
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into a formula might even mean membership to the overseeing committee is not as 
important. Since the amount of the allocation is already ensured by the formula, 
members do not need to be involved in the haggling for the dollars.  It is the non-formula 
money which is most important to committee members, as it is the money that they have 
an advantage in getting being involved in the allocation decisions.  
By failing to account for the implications of including formula dollars in studies 
involving distributive politics, that is, including dollars that have been siphoned off for 
districts that meet the formula requirements, previous studies have perhaps biased their 
results.  Allocations based on formulas are going to favor district need indicators as 
explanatory variables in models, as the formulas themselves are determined based on 
such determinants of need.  The rationale follows that including them in an analysis is 
going to result in findings that are biased toward the district needs indicators, which may 
hide evidence of the pork process.  Isolating the dollars of each committee program that 
are not distributed based on a formula, and remain theoretically up for grabs by 
politicians, brings further validity to this study.   
The outlay amount for each of the 435 districts, specified by federal program, as 
well as the relevant characteristics of the program (block, formula, etc), is available 
through Bickers and Stein’s Federal Assistance Awards Data System.   For each 
program, I removed the amount that was distributed by a need-based formula, leaving 
only non-formula dollars as the dependant variable.   
I selected the programs under the jurisdiction of the selected committees by 
going through every program in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (U.S. 
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General Services Administration 2004) and deciding if each program’s description 
corresponded with the jurisdiction of the respective committee included in the House 
rules.  I utilized the House parliamentarian as a cross-reference to confirm the 
committee’s jurisdiction over specific programs. This approach differs from Adler’s 
(2002, 94-95) approach of consulting hearings to determine the committee with 
jurisdiction.  Errors in my approach are likely to be programs included as Public Works 
or Agriculture that are not.  Examination of Adler’s database, however, revealed a 
number of programs that were not assigned a committee jurisdiction, suggesting that his 
approach misses some programs.  Some programs with no committee designation in 
Adler’s data seem likely to fall under the jurisdiction of the selected committees.  I 
believe my approach results in a more comprehensive listing of programs authorized by 
the Public Works and Agriculture committees.  Including those previously unspecified 
programs in this dataset is an important adjustment to Adler’s study. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables used in this study.  The 
average district receives $36,963,970 from the Public Works and Transportation 
Committee, with a minimum value of $0 and a maximum value of $1,577,397,000.  The 
mean district allocation for the Agriculture Committee is $51,309,130, with a minimum 
value of $-77,942,100, and a $3,009,278,000 maximum allocation to district.6 
 
                                                 
6
 The negative minimum value for the Agriculture Committee reflects Bickers and Stein’s measurement in 
the Federal Assistance Awards Data System.  The negative number reflects money allocated to a district 
that was not used, either because the recipient district has failed to comply with the terms of the program, 
or most commonly, the recipient has failed to spend up to the full obligation level (Bickers and Stein 
1990).  Negative total outlays of non-formula dollars occurred nine times for the Agriculture Committee.  
Because these values are not accurate accounts of how much was originally allocated to the district, I 
dropped these nine cases from the analysis. 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Public Works Committee Model Only 
Total Non-Formula 
Dollars for Public Works* 6090 36963970 109554900 0 1577397000 
Public Works Committee 
Membership 6090 .120525 .3256 0 1 
Public Works 
Appropriations 
Subcommittee Membership 
6090 .04334 .2052 0 2 
State Representation  on 
Public Works Committee 6087 .8141 .3889 0 1 
No. of Construction Works 
in district 6090 14688.1 4629.735 3167 33306 
District Flood Potential 6090 23.1150 53.2354 .01 367.4122 
Institutional and Electoral Indicators for Both Committee Models 
Seniority  6088 10.59593 8.1155 0 53 
Majority Party 6090 .5756 .4942 0 1 
Favorable District 
Partisanship 6068 .6702 .2763 .0005 .9999 
Increased Electoral Threat 5606 444.7295 379.9197 1.2738 5670.063 
Agriculture Committee Model Only 
Total Non-Formula 
Dollars for Agriculture* 6090 51309130 156381600 -77942100 3009278000 
Agriculture Committee 
Membership 6090 .1026 .3035 0 1 
Agriculture Appropriations 
Subcommittee Membership 6090 .0276 .1638 0 1 
State Representation on 
Agriculture Committee 6086 .6811 .4851 0 1 
Population in Rural Farm 
Areas 6090 11401.84 16960.92 0 121636 
Number of People Working 
in Farming 6090 6566.097 6514.898 332 47112 
Size of District in Square 
Miles 6090 60604.72 1823913 7 7.06e+07 
Population of District in 
Square Miles 6090 2400.98 6801.948 .703973 79773.43 
*Dependent Variables  
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Independent Variables 
Committee Members 
 The primary independent variable of interest is whether or not a member of the 
House is a member of the Public Works and Transportation or Agriculture committee.  
Following Adler (2002), I have measured not only whether or not each legislator was a 
member of the authorizing committee, but also of the corresponding Appropriations 
subcommittees.  Adler (2002) found evidence challenging the belief that appropriations 
subcommittee members are unbiased “guardians of the federal treasury” (Wallace 1960).  
Based on Adler’s argument and evidence, appropriation members are just as likely to 
seek pork projects for their districts as the standing committee members are.  I have 
coded membership to the selected standing committees and the corresponding 
appropriation subcommittee(s) as separate dichotomous variables (1=member, 
0=nonmember).   
Majority or Minority Party 
 As mentioned above, partisan influence may come in to play in distributive 
politics.  The majority party may assert their power when making allocation decisions 
that advantage their party members.  I specify what party the member belongs to in the 
model (majority=1, minority=0).   
Seniority 
 Another power structure within Congress that might contribute to members’ 
acquisition of federal funds for their district is the level of seniority.  Consistent with the 
gains-from-exchange theory, those who have the highest seniority on a committee might 
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have the strongest networks and more experiencing making the intra-committee 
logrolling deals that yields programs for their own districts (coded by actual seniority 
rank in Congress-at-large).  
Electoral Vulnerability 
The primary motivation in the distributive theory is desire for reelection.  
Members most vulnerable to defeat have the greatest incentive to pursue “pork,” and 
they should be more successful than those who are less threatened.  Students of 
congressional elections have used a number of indicators of electoral vulnerability, 
including vote margins, district presidential vote, experience and characteristics of the 
challenger, and campaign spending (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Bond, 
Fleisher, and Talbert 1997; Canon 1990; Jacobson 1989, 1990a, 1990b).  I use two 
indicators—general constituency partisanship and expected change in electoral threat.  
The partisanship of voters in congressional constituencies can range from 
strongly pro-Republican to relative partisan parity to strongly pro-Democrat.  Members 
from districts in which voters overwhelmingly favor their party are less vulnerable to 
defeat than those who represent districts with closely split party preferences; the most 
vulnerable members are those few who get elected in districts where voters strongly 
favor candidates of the other party.  I estimate district partisanship with a measure 
developed by Powell (2001).  This probability-based measure is interpreted as the 
probability that a Republican would win an open seat in a congressional district.  I orient 
this measure to the party of the incumbent, so that values closer to 1.00 indicate a high 
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probability the district would elect a candidate of the incumbent’s party in an open seat 
race, and values close to zero indicate a low probability.   
The available measures of vulnerability are objective indicators of what the 
researcher believes should be threatening to an incumbent.  The logic of using election 
margins, for example, is that incumbents who have close races are likely to feel more 
vulnerable than those who had a lopsided victory.  Such logic is generally correct, but it 
is a crude indicator of perceived threat.  There are undoubtedly members who had an 
easy election but know something about the politics of their districts that makes them 
feel insecure about the next election.  A measure based on incumbents’ behavior, 
therefore, is likely to be a better indicator of how safe the incumbent feels.  The 
literature offers guidance about how to construct a behaviorally based measure of 
insecurity. 
Research on congressional elections clearly demonstrates the importance of 
campaign finances.  The relative effects of incumbent and challenger spending, however, 
are subject to debate.  Research on campaign spending consistently shows that the more 
the incumbent spends the lower the vote margin.  The reason for this odd result is that 
incumbent spending is endogenous. Incumbents are able to raise and spend as much as 
required to respond to a threat—the more the challenger spends, the greater the threat, 
and the more the incumbent spends to try to fend it off.  Some times these efforts fail, 
and the incumbents that lose spend the most.  Those without vigorous opposition need to 
spend relatively little to rack up huge reelection margins.  Hence, there is a negative 
relationship between incumbent spending and vote margin (Jacobson 1980; 2001, 40).   
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The incumbent’s spending behavior from one election to the next, therefore, is a 
good indication of how vulnerable the incumbent feels.  My second indicator of 
vulnerability is the difference in incumbent spending in the upcoming and previous 
elections (incumbent spendingt - spendingt-1).  Incumbents who increase their spending 
relative to the previous election probably feel more threatened and vulnerable than those 
who decrease their spending. 
State Representation on a Committee 
 A state’s presence on a committee may impact whether money goes to any of the 
state’s districts.  Some programs allocate money to state governments first, which are 
then responsible for reallocating the money to the individuals, organizations, or 
institutions that qualify (Adler 2002).  A member may join a committee and benefit from 
bringing money not only to his or her district, but to the entire state.  This could be 
particularly true for members who represent districts that are portions of major cities, 
where multiple districts benefit from the allocation.  
District Need 
Federal benefits are most effective if they are directed at a district’s particular 
social, geographic, and economic needs (Carsey and Rundquist 1998).  An allocation is 
considered “pork” only if it is significantly greater than what is necessary to meet district 
need. To control for the effects of district need, I used two indicators of district 
characteristics that might indicate a need for federal programs under the jurisdiction of 
Public Works.  These control variables measure flood damage regions and the number of 
construction workers in the district, both serving as rough measures of the potential 
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district need for Public Works and Transportation programs. To control for the effects of 
district need for the Agriculture committee, I used four indicators of district 
characteristics that might indicate a need for federal programs under the jurisdiction of 
Agriculture.  First I included a measure of the number of people in a district identifying 
themselves as farm workers.  Second, a variable measuring the population in rural farm 
areas is included.7  These two variables capture the degree of farm activity within a 
district. I also included a measure of population per square mile of a district, using the 
logic that the less densely populated areas will be indicative of more agriculture 
activities; and size of district in square miles, following a similar logic, that the larger the 
district, the less people, which can be used as a loose indicator of agricultural regions.  
All of these district need variables are taken from Adler’s Congressional District 
Dataset, and are used in the attempt to most closely match the control variables Adler 
used in his 2002 study.8 
Method: Panel Analysis  
Because federal outlays are distributed to congressional districts over time, we need a 
method that accounts for both types of variance.  Panel analysis, a type of pooled cross-
section/time series analysis, is appropriate.  A panel design with multiple observations of 
each case increases degrees of freedom and the confidence we have in the coefficient 
estimates (Gujarati 1995, 522).  As is common in studies of political processes, these 
panels are unbalanced.  In this analysis of the distribution of program outlays from 1983 
                                                 
 
Rural farm areas comprise all rural households and housing units on farms (places from which $1,000 or 
more of agricultural products were sold in 1989.
8
 Adler did not include a description of what control variables he included in his model. 
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to 1996, for the two selected committees, the number of different representatives who 
served and ran for reelection (788) is much greater than the number of time points (14 
years). 
 The unbalanced pool prevents estimating panel corrected standard errors.9  The 
Hausman (1978) test offers guidance about whether a fixed effects or random effects 
model is appropriate.  We are unable to reject the null that the individual effects are 
correlated with the other regressors, so a fixed effects estimator is appropriate (Greene 
2003, 301-03).   
 
                                                 
9
 The effect is to overestimate the standard errors, which works against finding significant coefficients. 
                                                                                                                                           26
 
 
FINDINGS 
Public Works and Transportation Committee 
Table 2 reports estimates of the relationship between indicators of institutional 
position, electoral vulnerability, and district need on non-formula based outlays of Public 
Works Committee programs.  I should start with the observation that the model explains 
a trivial amount of the variance in federal outlays (R2 = .003).  However, there is debate 
in the discipline over the importance of the R2.  Some argue that the R2 is not 
particularly useful in assessing a model.  Instead, what is important is the F-test (model 
specification test)—which is statistically significant here (F (794,4547) = 19.63, p = 
0.0000).  The way to tell how strongly independent variables influence the dependent 
variable is to interpret the unstandardized regression coefficients (King, 1986).   
 Neither measure of district need is statistically significant in the model.  Districts 
with more construction workers do not receive higher outlays than those districts that 
have fewer workers.  An increase in the flood potential of a district does not have an 
effect on the amount of federal outlays allocated to a district either.10 
 None of the institutional position variables exert a statistically significance effect 
on the distribution of outlays.  In particular, the position of most interest for this 
analysis—membership on the Public Works and Transportation Committee—is not  
 
                                                 
10
 In another model (Appendix A), not excluding the formula based allocations, the construction worker 
variable was significant at the .05 significance level; an increase of about 4600 workers (a standard 
deviation change) was associated with an increase of about $6.4 million.  The coefficient for the flood 
potential of the district is not significant at normally acceptable levels (p = .053, with a one-tail test).  
Being that formula dollars are distributed primarily based on need, in a model not excluding formula 
allocations, it would seem reasonable that these control measures would be more significant than in the 
final model that only non-formula dollars. 
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Table 2.  Influences on Outlays of Public Works Committee Programs 
Independent Variables b (t-test) 
Substantive 
Effect 
 
Institutional Position 
Member Public Works Committee 2187.70  (0.43) --- 
Member Public Works Appropriations 
Subcommittee 
4579.73 
(0.59) --- 
State Representation on Public Works 
Committee 
-1969.80 
(-0.59) --- 
Seniority in Congress 382.50  (1.31) --- 
Majority Party 
 
-1982.53 
(-0.91) --- 
Electoral Vulnerability 
Favorable District Partisanship -15920.8**
 
(-3.15) F $4.4 Million 
Increased Electoral Threat 7.46** (2.50) $2.8 Million 
District Need 
District Flood Potential  18.75 (0.67) --- 
No. of Construction workers in Dist. .6273 (1.37) --- 
Constant 
 
30117.85 
(3.36) --- 
 
N 5494  
Overall R2 0.0017  
* p < .05  
** p < .000 
The substantive effect of statistically significant variables is estimated as the effect of changing the independent 
variable an amount equal to one standard deviation. 
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significantly related to outlays. Consistent with Adler’s (2002, 99) analysis, I found no 
evidence that members of this committee channel disproportionate benefits to their 
districts.  Further concurring with Adler’s findings, is that members of the appropriations 
subcommittee for Public Works, also do not target more Public Works and 
Transportation program dollars to their own districts than other districts.  An even 
broader test of the influence of committee membership--whether a member of Congress 
from one’s state serves on the committee benefits any of the other members from that 
state--also fails in this model.    Similarly, the model indicates that the other indicators of 
a member’s institutional position are not significant in determining the allocation of 
Public Works funds.  The more senior members and majority party members do not 
receive a disproportionate share of benefits.11 
The analysis does indicate that members who are most vulnerable to defeat 
receive disproportionate benefits.  Members from districts with a favorable partisan 
balance have less need and motivation to pursue “pork” than those from districts with 
hostile partisanship.  Those incumbent members who serve districts in which there is a 
partisan slant against their party, when there is a low probability the district would elect 
a candidate of the incumbent’s party in an open seat election, are able to acquire more 
pork projects for their district, than those members who serve districts that have a more 
favorable partisan climate. As seen in Table 2, if the probability of electing a candidate 
of the incumbent’s party in an open seat race increases about .28 (a one standard 
                                                 
11
 I also looked at several interactions and found no evidence that majority party members of Public Works 
or members with more committee seniority received greater allocations.  In addition, I logged the 
dependent variable to account for several large outliers; this model performed worse. 
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deviation change), then expected outlays from Public Works decline about $4.4 million.  
The second electoral indicator included in this analysis, also affects the allocation of 
Public Works pork projects.  Behavior indicating that the incumbent feels threatened in 
their upcoming election, which is measured by an increase in campaign spending from 
their previous election, is associated with disproportionate outlays.  Members who spend 
a standard deviation change in the upcoming election than in the previous one, acquired 
about $2.8 million more in outlays after controlling for influences.   It seems on the 
Public Works Committee political concerns motivate pork; whereas, one’s institution 
position seems to not have a significant impact on allocations. 
Agriculture Committee 
Table 3 reports estimates of the relationship between indicators of institutional 
position, electoral vulnerability, and district need on outlays of Agriculture programs.  
Again, as with the analysis of the Public Works Committee, the R2 is notably low, at 
.0001.   As mentioned earlier though, the F-Test for this model is significant (F(794, 
4782) = 34.50, p = 0.0000), thus satisfying some scholars. 
 Controls for district need vary in their explanatory power for the model.  Districts 
that have more people reporting employment in farming receive higher outlays than 
those districts who have lower amount of farm workers; an increase of about 6514 
workers (a standard deviation change) is associated with an increase of about $57 
million.  The coefficients for the population living in rural farm areas and the size of the 
district in square miles are not significant in this model.  Contrary to expectations, the 
coefficient for population per square mile is positive and significant at the .01 level. 
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Table 3.  Influences on Outlays of Agriculture Committee Programs 
Independent Variables b (t-test) Substantive Effect 
Institutional Position 
Member Agriculture Committee 30092.17** (3.20) $30.1 million 
Member Agriculture Appropriations 
Subcommittee 
45884.02** 
(4.10) $45.9 million 
State Representation on Agriculture 
Committee 
-3683.72 
(-1.20) --- 
Seniority in Congress 2708.08** (8.17) $21.9 million 
Majority Party -8978.76** (-3.50) -$4.4 million 
Electoral Vulnerability 
Favorable District Partisanship 2957.92 (0.50) --- 
Increased Electoral Threat 1.09 (0.32) --- 
District Need 
Population in Rural Farm Areas 3.14 (3.40) --- 
Number of People Working in 
Farming  
8.75** 
(6.26) $56.9 million 
Size of District in Square Miles -0.69 (-1.86) --- 
Population of District in Square Miles 3.14 (3.40) --- 
Constant 
 
-6043.69 
(-0.46)  
 
N 5588  
Overall R2 0.001  
* p < .05  
** p < .01 
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 None of the indicators of electoral vulnerability exert a statistically significant 
effect on the distribution of Agriculture outlays. Members from districts with a favorable 
partisan advantage in their next election are no more likely to receiving Agriculture 
outlays than those with a less favorable partisan balance within the district.  An increase 
in campaign spending--classified as an indicator of the incumbent feeling electorally 
threatened—is also not associated with disproportionate outlays.   
 Instead, it seems factors related to a member’s institutional position are much 
more influential in impacting a member’s ability to receive money for their district, in 
terms of for Agriculture programs.  The variable of most interest in this study—
membership on the Agriculture Committee—is significantly related to outlays.  
Consistent with Adler’s (2002) analysis, this model indicates that members of this 
committee are able to route disproportionate benefits to their districts.  Members of the 
Agriculture Committee benefit from a $30 million advantage in allocation of agriculture 
outlays than nonmembers.12  This model also shows that members of the Agriculture 
Appropriations Subcommittee are able to gain more Agriculture funds for their district, 
$46 million more than nonmembers, further providing evidence against the conventional 
assumption that members of the various appropriations committees do not have a 
personal stake in their assigned area.  The presence of a member on the standing 
                                                 
12
 This is a particularly interesting finding considering the state of Agriculture policy during this period.  
Congress instituted the system of direct payments in 1973, which in effect shifted the support of federal 
commodity programs from consumers to taxpayers.  Agricultural expenditures drastically increased during 
the farm crisis from $8.8 billion in 1980 to $31.4 billion in 1986, due to nearly all government supports a 
direct budgetary outlay (Sheingate 2001).  This increase in spending coincided with the deficit becoming a 
politically prominent issue--Agriculture programs suffered through budget cuts in both farm bills and 
omnibus budget acts in the 1980s.  Pierson (1994) asserted that deficit politics weakened the pro-spending 
logrolls and consequently reduced opposition to agriculture retrenchment; however, my finding 
demonstrates that pork barreling was alive and well in spite of this period of agriculture budget cutbacks. 
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committee does not benefit other members of Congress from the respective state’s 
amount of total Agriculture outlays.   
 Seniority in Congress does help members yield more outlays for their districts; 
an increase in seniority by one standard deviation change is associated with an increase 
of almost $22 million.   The effect of party is contrary to my expectations—members of 
the majority party receive significantly fewer Agriculture outlays than do members of 
the minority.  Majority party membership does not put members at any advantage; 
instead members of the minority party reap the benefits in agriculture outlays.  This 
relationship may occur because of the strong intra-committee logrolling effects that 
stress bipartisan (or party-blind) compromises and deals. Perhaps this phenomenon is 
indicative of the Agriculture committee being a forum for compromises between the two 
parties.  From an inter-committee logrolling perspective, maybe it is easier to buy 
minority party members off with agriculture allocations, for their agreement on other 
larger projects. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study set out to test whether members of committees with the reputation of 
being constituent service oriented have an advantage over non-committee members in 
acquiring distributive benefits for their districts.  In a previous study, Adler found that 
members of several committees in the House use their position to acquire 
disproportionate benefits—the lone exception is Public Works.  I wondered if I might 
reconcile this inconsistency with congressional folklore with changes in the research 
design—in particular, changing the dependent variable to a more valid measure 
including only program dollars that were not allocated by a pre-determined formula, as 
well as estimating the model with a pooled cross-section/time series design to account 
for the time dimension in the distribution of federal outlays.  By running analyses on two 
such committees, Public Works and Agriculture, I have found that the two committees 
make their allocation decisions based on different dynamics.  Consistent with Adler’s 
findings, Public Works members do not receive an advantage in acquiring pork projects 
over their non-committee counterparts; whereas, the most electorally vulnerable 
members of Congress receive the most Public Works program dollars.  Institutional 
position variables do play a significant role for Agriculture committee members, 
however, and the indicators of electoral vulnerability are not significant in that model. 
As a test to see how incrementalism affected the model, I created a lag of the 
dependent variable for each committee.  For the Agriculture Committee, the findings 
with the addition of the lag relatively held to their original results.  Members of the 
standing and appropriations subcommittees receive a pork advantage over nonmembers, 
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as well as those members who have more seniority and are of the minority party.  For 
Public Works, the addition of the lag washed out the significance of the electoral 
vulnerability indicators.13 
As Adler’s findings did, this study’s results raise the question of why two 
committees which both deal primarily with constituent service issues allocate their 
program funds using different indicators.  One possible explanation of this difference is 
that Agriculture could be attracting members that come from districts that have a higher 
degree of need for Agriculture programs, as well as from districts who have received 
money in the past and have a vested interest in continuing that line of money; whereas, 
the Public Works Committee may draw more from the chamber-at-large, attracting 
members with less need and a history of less interest.  In order to test this hypothesis, I 
ran another series of analyses using membership to either the Agriculture Committee or 
the Agriculture Appropriations Sub-Committee as the dependent variable,14 and pooled 
cross-sectional probit analysis as the estimator, with the district controls and electoral 
indicators as the explanatory variables, and in a second model including the lagged 
amount of non-formula dollars awarded to the district as a measure of interest.  As Table 
4 shows, three out of four of the district need indicators are significant in the expected 
direction of Agriculture committee membership, the population living in rural farm 
areas, the number people working in the farm industry, and the population of district in 
square miles.  The addition of the lagged non-formula dollars is also significant in  
                                                 
13
 For results, see Appendix B. 
14
 The dependent variable is dichotomous.  If a district’s member belonged to both the standing and 
appropriations subcommittee it is coded as 1. 
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Table 4.  Probit Analysis of Influence on Agriculture Committee Membership 
Model 1    Model 2 
Variable Coefficient (SE) 
Avg. Change, 
Min  Max 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Avg. Change, 
Min  Max 
Population in Rural 
Farm Areas 
0.0001** 
(3.78e-06) 0.029 
0.00002** 
(4.47e-06) -0.834 
Number of People 
Working in Farming 
0.0001** 
(0.00001) 0.893 
0.0001** 
(0.00001) 0.865 
Size of District in 
Square Miles 
1.03e-07 
(7.36e-08) 0.002 
1.03e-07 
(7.43e-08) 0.003 
Population of 
District in Square 
Miles 
-0.0004** 
(.0001) -0.003 
-0.0004** 
(0.0001) -0.004 
Favorable District 
Partisanship 
-0.5899** 
(0.1811) 0.0001 
-0.5679** 
(0.1843) 0.0001 
Increased Electoral 
Threat 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 0.0001 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 0.0001 
Lagged Total Non-
Formula Dollars for 
Agriculture 
--- --- 
0.0009** 
(0.0003) .101 
N 5592 5182 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Probit Analysis of Influence on Public Works Committee Membership 
    Model 1    Model 2 
Variable Coefficient (SE) 
Avg. Change, 
Min  Max 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Avg. Change, 
Min  Max 
No. of Construction 
Works in district 
9.20e-06 
(8.79e-06) 0.001 
8.78e-06 
(3.25e-07) 0.002 
District Flood 
Potential 
0.0032** 
(0.0006) 0.0001 
0.0029** 
(0.0007) 0.034 
Favorable District 
Partisanship 
-0.2513 
(0.1344) 0.028 
-0.2212 
(0.1524) 0.0001 
Increased Electoral 
Threat 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 0.0001 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) -0.002 
Lagged Total Non-
Formula Dollars for 
Public Works 
--- --- 
1.24e-06** 
(3.25e-07) 0.182 
N 5592 4990 
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explaining who is on the Agriculture Committee.  Table 5 shows the results for the 
Public Works Committee.  One of the two district need indicators is positively 
significant, the district’s flood potential.  The lag of the non-formula Public Works 
dollars also has a significant, positive impact on committee membership.   
Due to the limited number of district need indicators for the Public Works 
Committee in the model, compared to Agriculture, it is not appropriate to say that the 
Agriculture Committee attracts members of Congress with greater degrees of district 
need and interestedness.  Again, the question remains of why two constituency-service 
committees act so differently? 
Universalism could play a greater part in the process of allocating funds on 
specific committees than previously thought.  As mentioned above, previous empirical 
studies have found little evidence of coalitions larger than a simple majority forming in 
support of programs involving geographically concentrated benefits.  However, from an 
inter-committee logrolling perspective, perhaps the Public Works committee has been 
misdiagnosed as a committee that deals with primarily issues that are low is salience to 
the chamber-at-large.  Typically, constituency service committees have been categorized 
as being more autonomous than committees that deal with more prevalent policy issues, 
as non-committee members have less of an interest in the committee’s policy area, 
which enables these constituency-service committees to get their programs through 
Congress, despite that they reach only a minority of districts.  It could be that the policy 
area that Public Works has jurisdiction over may be high in salience for many non-
committee members, as compared with come committees that deal with more narrow 
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constituency interest, such as Agriculture.  Every district, regardless of population 
density, or size in square miles has the need for roads to be built and maintained, but 
many fewer districts have the need for federal funds for potato crops.  Because Public 
Works programs may be important for so many members of Congress, both committee 
and non-committee members, non-committee members may not allow as much 
discretion in allocation decisions to Public Works committee members, as they do to 
committees like Agriculture.  It could be that the widespread saliency of Public Works 
programs forces it to go against its perceived reputation of a pork committee. 
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APPENDIX A 
       Influences on Formula Only Outlays for the Public Works Committee 
Independent Variables b (t-test) 
Member Public Works Committee -2334.25 (-1.08) 
Member Public Works Appropriations 
Subcommittee 
-8098.94 
(-4.46) 
State Representation on Public Works 
Committee 
853.64 
(0.60) 
Seniority in Congress -1008.187** (-8.14) 
Majority Party 339.08 (0.36) 
 
Favorable District Partisanship 781.33 (0.36) 
Increased Electoral Threat -0.73 (-0.58) 
 
District Flood Potential  -9.15 (-0.77) 
No. of Construction workers in Dist. 0.14 (0.71) 
Constant 
 
14011.96 
(4.61) 
N 5351 
Overall R2 0.000 
* p < .05  
** p < .01 
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      Influences on Formula Only Outlays for the Agriculture Committee 
Independent Variables b (t-test) 
Member Agriculture Committee 3.81e+07 (3.14) 
Member Agriculture Appropriations 
Subcommittee 
5.90e+07 
(4.08) 
State Representation on Agriculture 
Committee 
4314078 
(-1.09) 
Seniority in Congress 4084144 (9.52) 
Majority Party -1.19e+07 (-3.59) 
 
Favorable District Partisanship -1435121 (-0.19) 
Increased Electoral Threat -227.93 (-0.05) 
 
Population in Rural Farm Areas -934.14 (-1.57) 
Number of People Working in Farming  8717.91 (4.83) 
Size of District in Square Miles -258.25 (-0.54) 
Population of District in Square Miles 4031.42 (3.38) 
Constant 
 
-4774816 
(-0.28) 
N 5580 
Overall R2 0.0003 
* p < .05  
** p < .01 
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APPENDIX B 
       Influences on Outlays of Public Works Committee Programs with lag 
Independent Variables b (t-test) 
Lag 0.39 (36.88) 
Member Public Works Committee -1465.38 (-0.34) 
Member Public Works Appropriations 
Subcommittee 
-4579.87 
(-0.70) 
State Representation on Public Works 
Committee 
-493.17 
(-0.17) 
Seniority in Congress -725.63** (2.81) 
Majority Party 122.75 (0.07) 
 
Favorable District Partisanship -5487.92 (-1.21) 
Increased Electoral Threat 1.64 (0.64) 
 
District Flood Potential  6.78 (0.29) 
No. of Construction workers in Dist. 1.00** (2.61) 
Constant 
 
15775.85 
(2.61) 
N 4749 
Overall R2 0.69 
* p < .05  
** p < .01 
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       Influences on Outlays of Agriculture Committee Programs with lag 
Independent Variables b (t-test) 
Lag 0.97 (39.23) 
Member Agriculture Committee 27366.15** (3.18) 
Member Agriculture Appropriations 
Subcommittee 
30279.17** 
(2.94) 
State Representation on Agriculture 
Committee 
-1723.98 
(-0.61) 
Seniority in Congress 1353.31** (4.27) 
Majority Party -5303.98* (-2.33) 
 
Favorable District Partisanship 7231.24 (1.36) 
Increased Electoral Threat 1.12 (0.36) 
 
Population in Rural Farm Areas 1.95* (2.35) 
Number of People Working in Farming  7.44** (5.97) 
Size of District in Square Miles -0.63 (-1.92) 
Population of District in Square Miles 1.95 (3.40) 
Constant 
 
-4340.18 
(-0.35) 
N 5178 
Overall R2 0.004 
* p < .05  
** p < .01 
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